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Throwing the Baby Out With the Bathwater:
Why Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome Should Be Allowed as a
Rehabilitative Tool in the Florida Courts
I. INTRODUCTION: A. THE CLASSIC CHILD ABUSE PROBLEM
While living at the home of her grandparents, a teenage girl is sexu-
ally abused by her grandfather.' He takes her into the garage, bends her
over the car, and inserts his finger, a dildo, and then his penis into her
vagina.' She flees to the home of a cousin. Upset and crying, she tells
the cousin that the grandfather has been pressuring her to have sex with
him. She then relates the specific details of the abuse. The cousin
allows the girl to move in with her. Over the course of the next few
months, the girl repeats the details of the abuse several times. A social
worker for child protective services visits the girl and finds her "very
nervous," "agitated," and "weepy at times." The girl expresses concern
that if she reports the abuse her family will not love her and tells the
social worker that she does not want her grandfather to go to jail.' The
girl tells her cousin that she had contact with her mother and the mother
told the girl that she (the girl) was the reason her grandfather was in jail
and that he would only be released if the girl tells the prosecutor that the
accusations of abuse were made up.4
The girl relates the abuse to yet another social worker, this one
works for child welfare services. After a juvenile court hearing deter-
mines that the girl should no longer live with her grandparents (where
her mother resides), the girl becomes hysterical, saying she has lost her
relationship with her mother. She tells the social worker that she is hurt
by the loss of her family's support.5
A police officer assigned to investigate the girl's case interviews
her and is told of the abuse. She tells him about pornographic videos that
her grandfather forced her to watch. Upon searching the grandparents'
home, the officer finds the pornographic videos and the dildo the girl
had described to him.' During preparation for her grandfather's trial, the
girl tells a court-appointed representative for abused children she is
1. People v. Housley, 6 Cal. App. 4th 947, 951 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
2. Id. at 953.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 952.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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afraid that she will be rejected by her family if she testifies against her
grandfather.7 The girl tells a social worker for the Department of Social
Services that she wants to be with her mother and requests an
unsupervised visit. A few days after the visit, the girl tells the social
worker that she had lied about the molestation and requests that charges
be dropped so no trial will take place.8 At trial, the girl insists that none
of the abusive events she had related earlier to the various social workers
actually occurred and that she had made the whole story up so she could
leave her grandfather's home to have more freedom.9
In response to the girl's recantation and a defense suggestion that
the girl's delay in reporting the abuse supports her claim of fabrication, a
psychologist testifies on behalf of the prosecution. The psychologist
tells the court that it is uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to imme-
diately report the abuse to authorities or other people. The psychologist
explains that victims often delay reporting abuse because it forces the
victim to relive the trauma of the abuse and cements in his mind the fact
that the abuse actually happened. The psychologist also testifies that it
is very common for victims of abuse to recant after first making a report.
This is because they feel they may not be believed or may be removed
from their home. Victims of abuse also fear the offender will suffer
negative consequences from the reported abuse. The psychologist adds
that victims of intrafamily abuse are more likely to recant since they
suffer more pressure and feel more guilt in making the report. 0 Despite
the girl's recantation, the girl's grandfather is convicted.
On appeal, the defendant challenges the admission of the psycholo-
gist's "syndrome" testimony. The appellate court finds the testimony
proper for several reasons:
1) [The psychologist] plainly testified she had never met [the girl],
was unfamiliar with the details of the case and had never read any
reports associated with this matter. Thus, she was not offering an
opinion on [the girl's] credibility.
2) The testimony was not used to suggest the molestation actually
occurred. Instead, it was offered to "disabuse the jury of some
widely held misconceptions ... so that it may evaluate the evidence
free of the constraints of popular myths."
3) The evidence was addressed to a specific "myth" or "misconcep-
tion." In this case the testimony was clearly intended to help explain
[the girl's] delay in reporting the abuse and her last minute recanta-
7. Id. at 953-54.
8. Id. at 954.
9. Id. at 951.
10. Id. at 952.
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tion of the charges. 1
B. The Problem Defined-Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome
This case illustrates one of the difficult questions facing courts who
must determine innocence or guilt in child abuse prosecutions: the
admissibility of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
("CSAAS"). The stickiness in the issue of admissibility of CSAAS is
magnified by the risk of an extremely injurious result of an incorrect
verdict. If abuse actually occurred, failure to convict may result in more
abuse and more victims of abuse. On the other hand, if no abuse
occurred, a conviction maligns the accused as one of society's most
hated criminals. The choice to convict or acquit is not a difficult one
only because of its potential consequences on both the alleged victim
and the defendant but also because the abuse often occurs in private,
away from any potential eyewitnesses.' 2 One appellate court has
described the enormity of this task as follows:
In reaching our decision today, we acknowledge the inherent difficul-
ties of proving sexual abuse. Usually, only two eyewitnesses exist,
the victim and the accused, thus putting a premium on credibility. It
is, therefore, often necessary for the prosecution to enlist the services
of an expert to explain the victim's unusual behavior in delayed
reporting, accommodation and like aberrations. However, we cannot
abrogate time-tested and fundamental tenets of evidence because
child sexual abuse is an increasingly prevalent problem.' 3
Because of the difficulty of procuring reliable evidence in a sexual abuse
case, psychological findings such as CSAAS may be the best evidence
that will ever be available. 4
C. Florida's Solution: Hadden v. State
Had the above facts taken place in Florida instead of California, the
Florida Supreme Court's holding in Hadden v. State5 would have pre-
vented the CSAAS evidence that proved so important in helping the jury
understand the girl's behavior from being admitted. The jury would
have been left with the conundrum of what to make of the girl's recanta-
11. Id. at 954-55.
12. See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosectuions, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2027, 2033 (1994).
13. Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 751 (Wyo. f993).
14. See Chandra L. Holmes, Note, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing
the Effects of a Misdiagnosis in the Law of Evidence, 25 TULSA L.J. 143, 160 (1989).
15. 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997).
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tion in light of the testimony of several witnesses to whom she had
related the abuse.
In Hadden v. State, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the inher-
ent tension between the need for expert testimony to assist the jury in
understanding the behavior of alleged victims and the standards for
admissibility of evidence. The Florida Supreme Court was faced with
two very different cases that had been consolidated on appeal.
The first of the two cases, also titled Hadden v. State, 6 arose from
the First District Court of Appeal. During the course of trial in Hadden,
the state proffered out of the jury's presence opinion testimony from
Doug Jones, a veteran mental health counselor and school psychologist,
concerning the symptoms and diagnostic criteria typically associated
with sexually abused children. Although the defense accepted Jones as
an expert in child abuse, the defense objected to his testimony. The
defense argued the testimony lacked scientific reliability because Jones
failed to identify enough diagnostic criteria to give an adequate descrip-
tion of the child's condition.' 7
The second of the consolidated cases, was appealed from the Fifth
District Court of Appeal. In Beaulieau v. State,' 8 a psychologist testi-
fied that based on his interviews with the child victim, the child's draw-
ings, and other tests, the victim fit the child-abuse profile.' 9 The court
stated:
The factors that led to (or at least contributed to) the psychologist's
opinion in our case that the boy met the child abuse profile were that
he was significantly attached to his father and believed his mother
was not protecting him; he had a feeling of helplessness and low self-
esteem; and he had difficulty in dealing with emotionally charged
situations. And ... the psychologist determined these factors from
the "house-tree-person" test in which the psychologist analyzes a
child's drawings.2°
After analyzing the drawing, the psychologist concluded:
[The victim] he used a lot of shading, not well thought out drawing
shadings, but confused shadings. That's often a sign of anxiety. [His
tree] was what we call barren. It was a nice full tree, but it didn't
have a root system. It gave the appearance as barren. As far as par-
ents doing something, there were only heads in the picture. He left
off the bodies. Often when children leave off their bodies or other
bodies, it's a sense of being out of control or somehow being dam-
16. 670 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
17. Id. at 79.
18. 671 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
19. Id. at 811.
20. Id.
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aged or victimized. z
After hearing the psychologist's testimony, the Florida Supreme Court
banned "syndrome testimony. 22 It stated that syndrome testimony
"may not be used in a criminal prosecution for child abuse. 2 3 In reach-
ing its decision, the Florida Supreme Court made several crucial analyti-
cal mistakes. First, the court failed to distinguish between CSAAS and
other, less reputable versions of "syndrome testimony."
Second, in condemning the use of CSAAS the Florida Supreme
Court failed to recognize its importance in rehabilitating the credibility
of an alleged victim when by her own behavior, such as long delays in
reporting the alleged abuse or a recantation, is now in question. Third,
in failing to recognize CSAAS as a rehabilitative tool, the Florida
Supreme Court misconstrued the very case law upon which Hadden pur-
ported to be grounded. Finally, given the rehabilitative nature of
CSAAS, the Florida Supreme Court failed to adequately justify its insis-
tence on submitting the use of CSAAS to a Frye24 test.
This Comment discusses the above points in detail, places the ques-
tion of the admissibility of CSAAS into a national context, and calls
upon the courts of Florida to clarify their stance by expressly acknowl-
edging the utility of CSAAS as a rehabilitative tool.
II. THE SYNDROMES DEFINED
A. Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome and Other Syndromes:
While a large part of the Hadden opinion addresses CSAAS, 5 the
broader language of the certified question before the court26 and the
holding27 indicate that the admissibility of Child Sexual Abuse Syn-
21. Id.
22. The Florida Supreme Court defined "syndrome testimony." "In such testimony, the expert
(usually a psychologist by training) testifies on the basis of studies that children who have been
sexually abused develop certain symptoms." Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1997).
23. Id.
24. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test is designed to prevent
scientific evidence that is not widely accepted within the relevant scientific community from being
admitted.
25. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 575.
26. The question certified was, "[in view of the [Florida] Supreme Court's holding in
Townsend v. State, does Flanagan v. State require application of the Frye Standard of
Admissibility to testimony by a qualified psychologist that the alleged victim in a sexual abuse
case exhibits symptoms consistent with those of a child who has been sexually abused." Id. at
574.
27. "We hold that expert testimony offered to prove the alleged victim of sexual abuse
exhibits symptoms consistent with one who has been sexually abused should not be admitted." Id.
at 577.
In sum, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that prior to the
introduction of expert testimony offered to prove the alleged victim of sexual abuse
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:561
drome ("CSAS") was also at issue. This is especially true in light of the
fact that neither of the two consolidated cases involved CSAAS
testimony.
CSAS is actually rather difficult to define and little consensus
exists amongst the courts and commentators as to what CSAS actually
encompasses. Generally, it appears as a conglomeration of Dr. Roland
Summit's28 work on post-traumatic stress disorder and other observa-
tions of a particular practitioner, Dara Loren Steel. Steel describes CSAS
as:
[I]t is an amalgam of the personal experience of a given expert com-
bined with what the expert knows of empirical studies and explana-
tory theories [such as Dr. Summit's CSAAS]. CSAS is merely the
label some courts and experts apply to the generalized laundry list of
behaviors which are commonly observed in abuse victims.29
This "amalagam" of a "generalized laundry list" causes confusion for
both the courts and the experts. 30 This murkiness has led some courts to
refuse to even recognize the existence of CSAS. 3' Regardless if CSAS
really exists, as long as it (or any other type of syndrome evidence) is
offered in Florida for the purpose of proving that a child exhibits symp-
toms consistent with those of a child sexually abused, the evidence is
governed by the rule of Hadden v. State.32 This is because Florida has
exhibits symptoms consistent with one who has been sexually abused, upon proper
objection the trial court must find that the expert's testimony is admissible under the
standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence announced in Frye v. United
States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and adopted in Florida. We
further hold that currently this evidence does not pass a Frye test; consequently, this
evidence may not be used in a criminal prosecution for child abuse.
Id. at 581.
28. See Roland Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse
& Neglect 177 (1983).
29. Data Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony: Seeking an Appropriate Admissibility
Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions; 48 DUKE L.J. 933, 944
(1999) (footnotes omitted).
30. Experts testifying in child sexual abuse prosecutions often fail to identify
explanative theories by name. More importantly, they also often fail to articulate
the theory or theories on which they are relying to form the bases of their opinions.
Sometimes experts employ by name the "child sexual abuse syndrome" when
relying on some combination of CSAAS, PTSD, and statement validation. In
reality, the experts most often simply introduce their "whole package" of evidence
bearing on the issue of whether the child has been sexually abused, without clearly
delineating the basis for the testimony.
Askowitz & Graham, supra note 12, at 2063 (footnotes omitted).
31. See, e.g., Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (Teague, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no recognized 'Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome' that contains consistent
elements. Rather, the syndrome is whatever the particular experts wants it to be, based upon
elements he himself has created or manufactured, or has plagarized (sic) from other's works.") Id.
at 926.
32. 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997).
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not sought to distinguish the syndromes, but chose instead to focus on
the purpose for which they are offered into evidence.
State v. J.Q.,33 arising out of New Jersey, has been identified as a
CSAS case using multiple explanative theories.34 When the children in
State v. J.Q. testified that they had failed to immediately disclose the
abuse and that even after the abuse had begun, they continued to want to
visit their father, the prosecutions psychologist used CSAAS to rehabili-
tate the children's credibility and explain their delayed disclosure."
Other behaviors of the children (such as crying, having nightmares, and
declining grades) were explained using the Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der Theory.3 6 The psychologist also compared the behavior of the chil-
dren to that of other sexual abuse victims known to her.37 As State v.
J.Q. illustrates, it should be apparent that there are clear, definable dif-
ferences between CSAS and CSAAS.
B. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
In 1983, concerned about societal reactions to the behavior of chil-
dren who allege sexual abuse, Dr. Roland Summit described the Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.38 This description of typical
reactions of child victims of sexual abuse is composed of five catego-
ries: (1) secrecy; 39 (2) helplessness;4 ° (3) entrapment and accommoda-
33. 617 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1993).
34. Askowitz & Graham, supra, note 12, at 2064.
35. Id. at 2066.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. "Evaluation of the responses of normal children to sexual assault provides clear evidence
that societal definitions of 'normal' victim behavior are inappropriate and procrustean, serving
adults as mythic insulators against the child's pain." Summit, supra note 28, at 188.
39. The average child:
never asks and never tells. Contrary to the general expectation that the victim would
normally seek help, the majority of the victims in retrospective surveys had never
told anyone during their childhood. Respondents expressed fear that they would be
blamed for what had happened or that a parent would not be able to protect them
from retaliation. Many of those who sought help reported that parents became
hysterical of punishing and pretended that nothing had happened.
Id. at 181.
40. This category can be described as:
Society allows the child one acceptable set of reactions to such an experience. Like
the adult victim of rape, the child victim is expected to forcibly resist, to cry for help
and to attempt to escape the intrusion. By that standard, almost every child fails ...
The normal reaction is to "play possum," that is to feign sleep, to shift position and
to pull up the covers. Small creatures simply do not call on force to deal with
overwhelming threat. When there is no place to run, they have no choice but to try
to hide. Children generally learn to cope silently with terrors in the night. Bed
covers take on magical powers against monsters, but they are no match for human
intruders... Adults must be reminded that the wordless action or gesture of a parent
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:561
tion;41 (4) delayed, unconvincing disclosure;42 and (5) retraction.43
is an absolutely compelling force for a dependent child and the threat of loss of love
or loss of family security is more frightening to the child than any threat of violence.
Id. at 183.
41. These categories are described as:
If the child did not seek or did not receive immediate protective intervention, there
is no further option to stop the abuse. The only healthy option left for the child is to
learn to accept the situation and to survive. There is no way out, no place to run.
The healthy, normal, emotionally resilient child will learn to accommodate to the
reality of continuing sexual abuse. There is the challenge of accommodating not
only to escalating sexual demands but to an increasing consciousness of betrayal
and objectifications by someone who is ordinarily idealized as a protective,
altruistic, loving parental figure. There is an inevitable splitting of conventional
moral values. Maintaining a lie to keep the secret is the ultimate virtue, while
telling the truth would be the greatest sin. A child thus victimized will appear to
accept or to seek sexual contact without complaint.
Id. at 185.
42. Disclosure:
is an outgrowth either of overwhelming family conflict, incidental discovery by a
third party, or sensitive outreach and community education by child protective
agencies... If family conflict triggers disclosure, it is usually only after some years
of continuing sexual abuse and an eventual breakdown of accommodation
mechanisms. After an especially punishing family fight and a belittling showdown
of authority by the father, the girl is finally driven by anger to let go of the secret.
She seeks understanding and intervention at the very time she is least likely to find
them. Authorities are alienated by the pattern of delinquency and rebellious anger
expressed by the girl. Most adults confronted with such a history tend to identify
with the problems of the parents in trying to cope with a rebellious teenager. They
observe that the girl seems more angry about the immediate punishment than about
the sexual atrocities she is alleging. They assume there is not truth to such a
fantastic complaint, especially since the girl did not complain years ago when she
claims she was forcibly molested. They assume she has invented the story in
retaliation against the father's attempts to achieve reasonable control and discipline.
The more unreasonable and abusive the triggering punishment, the more they
assume the girl would do anything to get away, even to the point of falsely
incriminating her father. Unless specifically trained and sensitized, average adults,
including mothers, relatives, teachers, counselors, doctors, psychotherapists,
investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and jurors, cannot believe that a
normal, truthful child would tolerate incest without immediately reporting or that an
apparently normal father could be capable of repeated, unchallenged sexual
molestation of his own daughter. The child of any age faces an unbelieving
audience when she complains of ongoing sexual abuse. The troubled, angry
adolescent risks not only disbelief, but scapegoating, humiliation and punishment as
well.
Id. at 187.
43. Retraction:
Whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it. Beneath the
anger of impulsive disclosure remains the ambivalence of guilt and the martyred
obligation to preserve the family. In the chaotic aftermath of disclosure, the child
discovers that the bedrock fears and threats underlying the secrecy are true. Her
father abandons her and calls her a liar. Her mother does not believe her of
decompensates into hysteria and rage. The family is fragmented, and all the
children are placed in custody. Once again, the child bears the responsibility of
either preserving or destroying the family. The role reversal continues with the
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Summit has been quick to concede, both at the time the original article
was published,44 and in later commentaries addressing courts' responses
to CSAAS, 45 that CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool to be used by practi-
tioners or courts to prove the existence of sexual abuse. Rather, it is a
clinical tool to understand the behavior of a child who has been sexually
abused. Within the judicial system, it should only be used to explain
seemingly inconsistent behavior and/or to rebut claims by the defense
that abuse has not occurred based on the child's delayed and unconvinc-
ing disclosure, recantation, or other inconsistent behaviors.46
III. NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SYNDROME EVIDENCE
The various states have responded in greatly different ways to syn-
drome evidence. These decisions can be placed on a spectrum from the
most liberal acceptance to the most restrictive. Some states have chosen
to treat the admission of the various syndromes separately. Others focus
only on the purpose for which they are offered into evidence.
"bad" choice being to tell the truth and the "good" choice being to capitulate and
restore a lie for the sake of the family. Unless there is special support for the child
and immediate intervention to force responsibility on the father, the girl will follow
the normal course and retract her complaint.
Id. at 188 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 179. "A syndrome should not be viewed as a procrustean bed which defines and
dictates a narrow perception of something as complex as child sexual abuge. A child who seeks
help immediately or who gains effective intervention should not be discarded as contradictory,
any more than the syndrome should be discarded if it fails to include every possible variant. The
syndrome represents a common denominator of the most frequently observed victim behaviors."
45. The distortion stems from misunderstanding of the word syndrome. In medical
tradition it means a list, or pattern of otherwise unrelated factors which can alert the
physician to the possibility of disorder. Such a pattern is not diagnostic. In court
circles, syndrome seems to mean a diagnosis which an expert witness contrives to
prove an injury. Syndrome evidence has become a generic term for diagnostic
medical or psychological testimony which must be closely scrutinized for scientific
reliability. Had I known the legal consequences of the word at the time, I might
better have chosen a name like the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Pattern to
avoid any pathological or diagnostic implications.
Roland Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 1(4) J. OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 153, 157 (1992) (hereinafter Summit II) (emphasis in original).
46. The proper foundation for relevance of CSAAS testimony is the inference raised
by the defense that an inconsistent pattern or disclosures by the child is indicative of
deceit. An abstract presentation of the CSAAS by an expert who has never seen the
child and knows virtually nothing about the case provides the jury with a
demonstrably objective refection. There is no possibility that such an expert has
couched the testimony to buttress the credibility of percipient witnesses. Ideally, the
jury will be allowed to understand what is normal and real for child victims as a
class, even if courts persist in seeing such conditions as pathological.
Id. at 148; see also Arthur H. Garrison, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Issues of
Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 10 Issues in Child Abuse Accusations 52 (1998).
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A. Syndrome Evidence as Proof of Abuse
Early decisions found syndrome or profile evidence useful and con-
vincing and some courts even allowed such evidence as proof of abuse,
permitting an expert to testify that because a child fits the expert's
behavioral criteria for diagnosing abuse, the child therefore had been
abused.47 None of these decisions specifically mention CSAAS. Most
states, however, that have addressed the issue found syndrome evidence
inadmissible as proof of abuse, with some states even overturning earlier
decisions to the contrary.48 Roughly half of these decisions specifically
address CSAAS. The others bar any syndrome evidence as proof of
abuse.49
B. Behavior or Statements Consistent with Abuse
Disagreement exists on the issue of the admissibility of syndrome
evidence where the testifying expert merely describes certain behavioral
characteristics of the child as being consistent with sexual abuse and
then concludes, based on the child's behavior, statements, or both, that
the child has likely been abused. An early anomaly was State v. Kim,5°
in which the Hawaii Supreme Court allowed an expert to testify that the
child complainant's allegations of abuse were truthful. Numerous cases
have ruled such implication evidence inadmissible as proof that an
assault actually occurred, 5 but few have explicitly addressed CSAAS.52
Other jurisdictions have ruled in favor of admissibility when the expert
presents evidence of abuse through implication, but refrains from giving
an explicit opinion on whether the abuse occurred.53
47. See generally Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska
1991); In Re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), overruled in part by People v.
Brown, 883 P.2d 949 (Cal. 1994); State v. Hester, 760 P.2d 27 (Idaho 1988); State v. Geyman,
729 P.2d 475 (Mont. 1986); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705 (Nev. 1987); State v. Timperio, 528
N.E.2d 594 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); State v. Schumpert, 435 S.E.2d 859 (S.C. 1993); State v.
Morgan, 485 S.E.2d 112 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123 (W.
Va. 1990).
48. See generally State v. York, 564 A.2d 389 (Me. 1989); State v. Chamberlain, 628 A.2d
704 (N.H. 1993); State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rimmasch,
775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); State v. Gokey 574 A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Jones, 863 P.2d 85
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
49. See People v. Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Leon, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986); State v.
J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1992); People v. Duell, 558 N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
50. 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982), overruled by State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990).
51. See generally State v. Moran 728 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1986); Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916
(Ark. 1986); People v. Jeff, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d
489 (N.J. 1992).
52. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich.
1990).
53. See generally United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
[Vol. 55:561
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C. Rehabilitative or Rebuttal Use of Syndrome Evidence.
The use of syndrome evidence to rebut claims by the defense that a
child complainant's behavior, such as delays in reporting or retraction of
allegations, is inconsistent with his claims of abuse has received "almost
universal approval"54 (of course excluding Florida). Roughly half of the
cases surveyed specifically rule on the validity of use of CSAAS for
such purposes." The other half of the cases allow any rehabilitative or
rebuttal testimony which seeks to define the behavior of the abused.56
To rationalize the use of CSAAS testimony to rehabilitate rather
than as evidence that the child's behavior is "consistent with abuse,"
courts will allow CSAAS for double negative of "not inconsistent with
abuse." Given the proper procedural safeguards, however, this distinc-
tion becomes less meaningful. Some courts require limiting instructions
be given to the jury in the case of rebuttal CSAAS testimony, stating
that such evidence is not to be used substantively as evidence that the
victim is telling the truth.57 Additionally, the California courts require
St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987); Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277 (Kan. 1989); State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, (S.D.
1999); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989); State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d 766. (Vt. 1990).
54. State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 183 (N.J. Ct. App. 1991).
55. See generally People v. Stark, 261 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Ct. App., 1989); People v.
Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Gray, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986); People v. Dunnahoo, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Wasson,
569 N.E.2d 1321 (I11. 1991); People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Steward v.
State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995); Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995); People v. Beckley,
456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990); People v. Gallow, 569 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); State
v. Garfield, 518 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1986). But see Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930
(Ky. 1989); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth v. Dunkle,
602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
56. See, e.g., Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138 (Ala. 1989); Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d 290
(Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Bostic v. State, 772 P.2d 1089 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1991); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (Ariz.
1986); State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. 653 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987); State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112
(Conn. 1989); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987); Hicks v. State, 396 S.E.2d 60 (Ga.
1990); State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990); State v. Preston, 581 A.2d 404 (Me. 1990);
State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988); People v. Matlock, 395 N.W.2d 274, (Mich. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Sandberg, 406 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1987); State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.
1987); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); State v. Davis, 422 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988); Hosford v. State, 560 So. 2d 163 (Miss. 1990); Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326 (Nev.
1984); People v. Benjamin R., 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); State v. Timperio, 528
N.E.2d 594 (Ohio 1987); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983); State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d
183, 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Rogers, 362 S.E.2d 7 (S.C. 1987); State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d
766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Hicks, 535 A.2d 776 (Vt. 1987); State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173 (Wash.
1984); State v. Cleveland, 794 P.2d 546 (Wash. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Madison, 770 P.2d 662
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. 1988); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570
(Wyo. 1990); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).
57. See generally People v. Housley, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 660 (Okla. 1991).
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that the evidence be targeted at a specific misconception.58 The trend in
courts is moving towards allowing an expert to testify only to the gen-
eral attributes of an abused child not as to whether or not the alleged
victim exhibits those attributes. This allows the jury to make the deter-
mination of the child's veracity and the defendant's guilt or innocence.
To help ensure that the expert does not comment on the particular child
alleging abuse, some states require that the expert not meet or examine
the child.59 But even an expert with no familiarity with the child or his
specific behavior can be of great help to the jury in understanding unu-
sual behaviors.60  Finally, some courts have imposed a procedural
restriction on the presentation of syndrome evidence, allowing it only
after the defense has specifically attacked the credibility of the child.6'
D. Syndrome Evidence Inadmissible for any Purpose
On the extreme end of the spectrum are the states, Florida being
among them, that have deemed syndrome evidence inadmissible for any
purpose. 62 These courts conclude that syndrome evidence is not a gen-
erally accepted medical concept, fails to discriminate between abused
and non-abused children, and has no relevance to the issue of the alleged
abuser's guilt or innocence.63 Those concerns, however, are misplaced
and invalid as CSAAS is an attempt to explain behavior that is seem-
ingly inconsistent with being a victim of sexual abuse and not a diagnos-
tic tool.
IV. THE HISTORY OF SYNDROME EVIDENCE IN FLORIDA
The opinions of the Florida courts have ranged the spectrum from
58. People v. Bowker 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 393-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
59. See State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1999); People v. Housley, 6 Cal. App. 4th
947 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
60. Rosemary L. Flint, Note: Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Admissibility
Requirements, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 192 (1995).
61. See People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Nelson,
561 N.W.2d 439 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 659 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991).
62. See Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth v. Dunkle,
602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
63. The child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not like a fingerprint in that it
can clearly identify the perpetrator of a crime. Even if all of the children of the
appellant exhibited some or all of the symptoms of the syndrome, it would not
follow that the appellant was conclusively, or even probably, guilty of child abuse.
The testimony about the child abuse syndrome, even had it been offered by a
psychiatrist or psychologist, and even if it were shown to be a medically accepted
concept, was for the most part irrelevant to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the
appellant.
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930, 932-33 (Ky. 1989).
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lenient admission of syndrome evidence to the eventual outright ban
enacted through the Hadden case.
A. CSAS in Florida
In Ward v. State,64 Florida's first encounter with syndrome evi-
dence,65 the First District Court of Appeal held that a qualified expert
should be allowed to render an opinion that a child displayed behavioral
symptoms consistent with those displayed by children who have been
sexually abused. 66  The 1988 Ward decision was grounded in section
90.702, Florida Statutes, which provides:
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS. If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence
or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about
it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only
if it can be applied to evidence at trial.67
The Ward court looked to two earlier decisions for guidance,68 one rati-
fying the use of the battered wife syndrome,69 the other finding the use
of post-traumatic stress syndrome evidence admissible in a child sexual
64. 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
65. After testifying to having studied symptoms of children who have been sexually abused,
the expert outlined three general types of symptoms displayed and testified that in her opinion the
child displayed the symptoms typically seen in children who have been sexually abused. The
three types of symptoms were referred to as: sexual behavior (suggestions of sexual activities, e.g.
sexual play with toys); behavioral reactions (extreme passiveness or aggressiveness, changes in
eating, underachievement); and emotional reactions (sleep disturbances, physical and depressive
reactions). Id. at 1083.
66. Myers tells us that most courts addressing the issue in the first years after Summit's
announcement of CSAAS found syndrome evidence admissible due to the perceived relationship
to Battered Child Syndrome. See John E.B. Myers, The Tendency of the Legal System to Distort
Scientific and Clinical Innovations: Facilitated Communication as a Case Study, 18 J. OF CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 505 (1994).
[Courts] quickly and correctly accepted expert testimony on battered child
syndrome to prove physical child abuse. By 1983 the legal community had become
accustomed to syndrome evidence to prove physical abuse. When child sexual
abuse accommodation appeared on the scene, some attorneys made the mistake of
comparing the accommodation syndrome to battered child syndrome, concluding-
erroneously-that the accommodation syndrome, like battered child syndrome, is a
diagnostic tool. Laboring under this misconception, some prosecutors used the
accommodation syndrome as evidence of abuse. Of course, the accommodation
syndrome is not a diagnostic device, and the misuses of the accommodation
syndrome led to confusion that persists to this day.
Id. at 508 (emphasis in original). Florida accepted the use of Battered Child Syndrome in
Albritten v. State, 221 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
67. Ward, 519 So. 2d at 1084.
68. Id.
69. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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assault case. 70 Among the factors listed in those cases to help courts
determine whether expert testimony should be admitted are: (1) the
qualifications of the expert to give an opinion on the subject matter;71
(2) whether the state of the scientific knowledge permits a reasonable
opinion to be given by the expert;72 (3) whether the subject matter of the
expert opinion is so related to some science, profession, business, or
occupation as to be beyond the understanding of the average layman; 73
and (4) relevance under section 90.403, Florida Statutes, which asks
whether the proffered testimony is more probative or prejudicial.74
Using these criteria and focusing mainly on the relevance of the testi-
mony offered the Ward court found the "child abuse syndrome" research
to be an area sufficiently developed to permit an expert to testify that the
symptoms observed in the evaluated child were consistent with those
displayed by victims of child abuse.75
Shortly thereafter, in Brown v. State,76 a Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services counselor was allowed to testify not only to the
fact that the child exhibited the signs she generally looked for to deter-
mine abuse, but that in the counselor's opinion, the child was in fact
abused.77 The First District Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and
noted only that it may have been more appropriate for the witness to
testify that the child's behavior was "consistent with" a child who had
been sexually battered or abused, rather that testifying that the child was
sexually abused, as a jury would be likely to misconstrue the expert's
opinion.78
The issue of what constitutes proper testimony came before the
Supreme Court of Florida in Glendening v. State,7 9 where the trial court
had allowed an expert to render an opinion "within a reasonable degree
of professional certainty as to whether or not [the child] had been sexu-
ally abused."8 Basing its opinion on the analysis of the admissibility of
expert testimony established by Ward and Kruse, the court held that "[a]
qualified expert may express an opinion as to whether a child has been
the victim of sexual abuse."'"
70. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
71. Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 805.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kruse, 483 So. 2d at 1384-85.
75. See Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Ist DCA 1988).
76. 523 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
77. Id. at 730.
78. Id.
79. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
80. Id. at 220.
81. Id. at 220-21.
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Two years later in Flanagan v. State82 the First District Court of
Appeal addressed the admissibility of testimony related to studies which
identify certain shared characteristics of persons who commit child sex-
ual abuse and the home settings in which child sexual abuse frequently
occurs.8 3 The use of offender profile testimony was found inadmissible
as substantive evidence to prove the guilt of a defendant charged with
child sexual abuse, but admissible as background information to pro-
mote juror understanding of a phenomenon which is "not so understand-
able that people know as much about it as a qualified expert with the
requisite skill and exposure to numerous studies in the field."84
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Ervin declared, "I consider
that novel psychological syndrome or profile evidence, when offered for
a non-rehabilitative purpose .. .cannot survive a Frye test," and he
called for the Kruse/Ward line of cases to be reconsidered." He
reviewed a large number of cases from other jurisdictions that have
rejected the use of such expert psychological evidence to prove child
sexual abuse,86 as well as the current legal and professional literature
and concluded:
Even among those scholars who believe there are typical symptoms
and behaviors that result from sexual abuse, there is a lack of consen-
sus regarding the ability of an expert to determine whether a particu-
lar child with such traits or symptoms has, in fact, been abused.
Perhaps even more pronounced is the lack of agreement among the
experts as to the reliability of such profiles.87
In an important caveat to his opinion, and despite his strong denuncia-
tion of novel syndrome/profile evidence, Judge Ervin took great pains to
emphasize that the type of evidence that was inadmissible for purposes
of proving that abuse had happened could be admitted for rehabilitative
purposes.88 Guidelines for the admission of this evidence were sug-
82. 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
83. Id. at 1099.
84. Id. at 1100.
85. Id. at 1113-14.
86. Judge Ervin did not confine his discussion to the sex offender profile at issue, but
included in his discussion techniques as varied as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory, penile plethsymograph testing, rape trauma syndrome, CSAAS, child molest syndrome,
use of anatomically correct dolls, and psychological profiling of typical child victims of sexual
abuse. Id. at 1113-14. It appears that the blurring of the lines between CSAS and CSAAS begins
here, although Judge Ervin can hardly be faulted for his attempt to examine the issue in a national
context.
87. Id. at 1116.
88. "If, however, the defense has attacked a witness's credibility, the courts often permit
profile or syndrome evidence for the purpose only of rehabilitating the witness by showing that
such apparently inconsistent conduct is in fact consistent with the syndrome or characteristics of a
sexually assaulted victim." Id. at 1114 (citations omitted). It was also noted that:
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gested based on the decisions of the California courts.8 9
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court resoundingly denounced the
decision of the district court of appeal and called Judge Ervin's dissent
"an excellent and thorough discussion of this issue." 90 The Florida
Supreme Court held the use of profile testimony as background informa-
tion is prohibited because it is highly prejudicial, 9 1 irrelevant to the out-
come of a case, 91 and "completely inappropriate as substantive evidence
of guilt."93 Unlike in Judge Ervin's opinion, the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion made no mention of the potential use of profile evidence
to rehabilitate a witness's credibility after it has been attacked.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Flanagan seemed to have
invalidated the premise of Kruse on which Glendening had been based.
As a result of Flanagan, it appeared that Florida now required general
acceptance by the relevant scientific community as a predicate for the
introduction of profile evidence of any kind. In addition, it appeared
None of the courts that permitted admission of such testimony for rehabilitation
purposes discussed whether such expert testimony complies with the Frye general
acceptance standard. Nevertheless, as one commentator explains: "There probably
is general acceptance of CSAAS or of its typical characteristics for the purpose of
explaining a child's delay in reporting or retracting." In other words, the relevant
scientific community would probably agree that a particular child's conduct is
consistent with characteristics common to the syndrome, but would not agree that
such.traits are necessarily predictive of sexual abuse.
Id. at 1118 (citation omitted). This was exactly the type of courtroom usage of CSAAS that
Summit had intended. See Summit II, supra note 45.
89. Before such evidence should be introduced for such limited purpose, the
government should be required to identify the misconception which the evidence
was designed to rebut. Furthermore, once it is identified, the jury must be instructed
simply and directly that the expert's testimony is not intended and should not be
used to determine whether the victim's molestation claim is true... The evidence is
admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victims reactions as
demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested.
Flanagan, 586 So. 2d at 1118 (citing People v. Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Cal Ct. App. 1988)).
90. Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).
91. Profile testimony ... by its nature necessarily relies on some scientific principle or
test which implies an infallibility not found in pure opinion testimony. The jury will
naturally assume that the scientific principles underlying the expert's conclusion are
valid. Accordingly, this type of testimony must meet the Frye test, designed to
ensure that the jury will not be misled by experimental scientific methods which
may ultimately prove to be unsound.
Id. at 828.
92. Inexplicably, the majority opinion below held that this evidence was admissible
without meeting Frye because it was introduced as "background information." We
are somewhat confused by this holding. If the evidence was not admitted as
substantive evidence of guilt, then it was irrelevant. The courtroom is not a
classroom to be used to educate a jury on an entire field only tangentially related to
the issues at trial.
Id. at 829.
93. Id.
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likely that the Florida Supreme Court was ready to re-examine the use of
any such evidence in Florida courts.94 The stage was set for the Hadden
decision.
B. CSAAS in the Florida Courts
Compared to CSAS, CSAAS has received relatively little attention
in Florida. All of the Florida decisions prior to Hadden approve of the
use of CSAAS to some degree. In Flanagan v. State, Judge Ervin
declared it useful for rehabilitative purposes.95 In M.B. v. Dept. of
Health and Rehabilithtive Services,9 6 CSAAS was offered to explain a
child's recantation of her previous allegations of abuse by her stepfather.
In Jones v. State,9 7 it was declared to be "widely respected on a psycho-
logical and sociological level"98 and even potentially useful in the crimi-
nal context.99 This sense of approval in the case law makes the decision
in Hadden that much more surprising.
V. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE HADDEN DECISION
The Hadden court addressed "the introduction of a psychologist's
expert testimony offered to prove the alleged victim of sexual abuse
exhibits symptoms consistent with one who has been sexually abused"
and required that such testimony be subjected to a Frye test.' °°
A. Hadden's Failure to Distinguish Between CSAAS and CSAS
CSAS and CSAAS are two very different approaches to syndrome
evidence. The origins of CSAAS can be traced,' while those of CSAS
cannot. 12 Although the testimony offered in the trials at issue in Had-
den could not be construed as CSAAS testimony, the Hadden court's
discussion centered on the admissibility of CSAAS. There is an argu-
94. See Toro v. State, 642 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
95. 586 So. 2d 1085, 1100-14.
96. 21 FLA. L. WEEKLY 1817 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 13, 1996).
97. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994) (holding that, despite Florida's recognition of the right of a
minor to an abortion, no right to sexual intercourse exists for minors, thus, consent is not a defense
to a charge of sexual battery where the alleged victim is a minor).
98. Id. at 1090 (Kogan, J., concurring) (discussing, in the context of CSAAS, the potential for
sexual exploitation of young people and the gross error of believing that they have "consented").
99. I recognize that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome has been
controversial in other states when used to help prove child sexual exploitation in a
criminal context. However, the controversy stems in part from the unusually severe
burden of proof the state must shoulder in a prosecution or from the strict procedural
rules of a criminal trial, which may differ from Florida's.
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 1997).
101. See infra Section I.B.
102. Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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ment, based on the wording of the certified question, that the Florida
Supreme Court sought only to address the use of CSAAS when offered
as actual proof that the abuse occurred, 10 3 but given that no such
attempts had been made in the courts below, it is unclear why this was
found necessary to the discussion. None of the Florida cases discussing
CSAAS indicate any attempts to use it in such a manner.'" By incor-
rectly including CSAAS in their discussion of syndrome evidence that
might be offered as proof of abuse, the Florida Supreme Court placed it
in a negative light and may have had a chilling effect on its use even for
appropriate purposes. 115
B. Hadden's Failure to Correctly Interpret Applicable Case Law
I. THE CALIFORNIA CASES
In Hadden, the California case of People v. Gray'06 is cited for the
proposition that CSAAS as a means of predicting sexual abuse, has been
the subject of considerable criticism.107 While that is concededly true,
the ultimate holding in the Gray decision is drastically different than that
of Hadden. In Gray, the expert testimony was not admitted as a means
of proving that abuse had occurred, but to point out that delayed report-
ing and inconsistency are not unusual with victims of child molesta-
tion.108 The Gray court allowed the testimony "since the expert did not
make a diagnosis of molestation, nor did he rely on a detailed analysis of
the facts in the case at hand."'0 9 The opinion acknowledged that rebuttal
through expert testimony may play a particularly useful role by disabus-
ing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about abuse and abuse
victims, thus allowing the jury to evaluate the evidence free of the con-
straints of popular myths.1 0 Additionally, the court deemed the Frye
test inapplicable. The testimony was "admissible as bona fide rebuttal"
since it was not introduced-and did not purport-to prove the molesta-
tion occurred. "'
For the same proposition (that CSAAS has been criticized as a
method of predicting sexual abuse) the Hadden court cited In re Sara
103. See supra note 24.
104. See supra notes 93-95.
105. Since Hadden, only Irving v. State, 705 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), and Correia v.
State, 695 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), mention CSAAS in the context of child abuse
prosecutions.
106. 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
107. Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1997).
108. See Gray, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 664.
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M.11 2 This was especially remarkable in that the syndrome at issue in
the case was the "child molest [sic] syndrome."'1 13 No mention of
CSAAS is even made. The Bowker and Housley cases already discussed
more accurately reflect the stance of the California courts on CSAAS.
California courts are allowing CSAAS testimony to be used for rehabili-
tation, with some safeguards to protect against its misapplication.
ii. HADDEN's FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE CSAAS AS A VALUABLE
REHABILITATIVE TOOL (AS ESTABLISHED IN FLORIDA CASELAW AND
THE CASE LAW OF OTHER STATES)
The Hadden decision states "we found helpful Judge Ervin's con-
curring and dissenting opinion [in Flanagan]."' 4 Yet, while Judge
Ervin's Flanagan opinion had gone to great lengths to endorse CSAAS
as a rehabilitative tool, no such attempt was made by the Hadden court.
Courts" 5 and scholars alike have ratified the use of CSAAS for
rehabilitative purposes. For example, John Myers, a noted scholar, tells
us:
The accommodation syndrome has a place in the courtroom. The syn-
drome helps explain why many sexually abused children delay
reporting their abuse, and why many children recant allegations of
abuse and deny that anything occurred. If use of the syndrome is
confined to these rehabilitative functions, the confusion clears, and
the accommodation syndrome serves a useful forensic purpose." 6
In light of this almost universal acceptance, it is difficult to understand
why the Hadden court failed to clarify their stance.
D. Hadden's Failure to Explain Why CSAAS, As a Rehabilitative
Tool, Should Be Submitted to a Frye Test:
According to Hadden, "syndrome testimony in child-abuse prose-
cutions must be subjected to a Frye test. . ." '" where it will fail as "such
evidence has not to date been found to be generally accepted in the rele-
vant scientific community.""' 8 The underlying theory for Florida's
adherence to Frye" I 9 is that "a courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such
112. In re Sara M., 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
113. Id. at 607.
114. Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997).
115. See supra notes 51-53.
116. John E.B. Myers et. al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Litigation 1989, 68 NEB.
L. REV. 1, 64 (1989).
117. Id.
118. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 577.
119. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle or discovery, the thing from which
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it is not the place to conduct scientific experiments. If the scientific
community considers a procedure or process unreliable for its own pur-
poses, then the procedure must be considered less reliable for courtroom
use."'
120
Since CSAAS does not purport to be a diagnostic tool, the "labora-
tory" concern would seem to be unwarranted. Nor does the fact that
CSAAS is not in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders IV, a diagnostic manual widely recognized by the industry, seem
probative of this issue. 12' As a non-diagnostic tool, CSAAS would have
no real place there. It is generally recognized that when CSAAS is used
for rehabilitative purposes, no Frye test is needed. 122 Even if the test
were applied, CSAAS should pass if used for rehabilitative purposes. 123
CONCLUSION
One can only speculate why the Hadden court based so much of
their opinion on CSAAS given that the admissibility of CSAAS had not
been the issue before either of the trial courts in this consolidated case
and CSAAS, and its proper courtroom usage as articulated by Summitt,
in no way match the type of evidence the certified question seeks to
analyze. Perhaps the Florida Supreme Court saw the case as an opportu-
nity to clarify the use of syndrome evidence in the Florida courts. How-
ever, they failed on several counts. To truly clarify the current situation,
several steps must be taken:
1) A clear demarcation between CSAS and CSAAS must be
established. 121
2) It must be recognized that the proper use of CSAAS is for the
rehabilitation of the child's credibility.
3) Rehabilitation should be allowed both as a rebuttal, where the
defense has called specific aspects of the child's behavior into ques-
tion, and as an "anticipatory rebuttal" where the child's behavior
aligns with a specific aspect of the CSAAS, such as lengthy delay
before disclosure or a recantation. 25
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
120. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 577 (citing Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989)).
121. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS IV (1994).
122. See People v. Gray, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
123. Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085, 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
124. Clearly, there is a difference between pointing out that a child has recanted and this is not
unusual for victims of sexual abuse and saying that because a boy drew a tree without roots and
human figures without bodies, he has probably been abused. See Beaulieau v. State, 671 So. 2d
807 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
125. People v. Patino, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345, 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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4) It must be determined what if any limiting instructions should be
given to a jury presented with CSAAS for rehabilitative purposes. 126
In conclusion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida elaborated on
the balance between admission of syndrome testimony and the rules of
evidence as follows:
Due to the extraordinary difficulty of proving child sexual abuse
cases, because of the environment in which they occur, courts should
welcome reliable evidence that will aid the jury in understanding this
awful crime; on the other hand, our justifiably zealous urge to punish
those who commit such appalling acts ought not entice us to use evi-
dence that can have an impact on the minds of the jury far dispropor-
tionate to its foundation in science. 27
CSAAS is the "reliable evidence that will aid the jury in understanding."
Only after the above-mentioned issues are resolved will the true balance
sought by the Florida courts exist.
MICHAEL D. STANGER*
Denying the prosecution the opportunity to introduce [syndrome] testimony as part
of its case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal could lead to absurd results ... It would be
natural for a jury to wonder why the molestation was not immediately reported if it
had really occurred... If it were a requirement of admissibility for the defense to
identify and focus on the paradoxical behavior, the defense would simply wait until
closing argument before accentuating the juror's misconceptions regarding the
behavior. To eliminate the potential for such results, the prosecution should be
permitted to introduce properly limited credibility evidence if the issue of a specific
misconception is suggested by the evidence.
Id.
126. Here, the approach of the California courts seems quite sensible. "First, to be admissible
on a misconception theory, the evidence must be targeted to a specifically identified
misconception and narrowly limited to address only that misconception. Second, the jury should
be instructed that it is not to use such testimony for the purpose of demonstrating that the victim
was sexually abused." People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 393-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
127. Toro v. State, 642 So. 2d 78, 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
* The author wishes to thank Professor Michael Graham for helping the Evidence
Symposium writers along with, Professors Bernie Perlmutter and Carolyn Salisbury of the
University of Miami Children and Youth Law Clinic for their inspiring advocacy on behalf of
children, and his wife Dawnelle for her inexhaustible supply of patience.
